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The recent financial turmoil highlights the incentive of highly leveraged financial institutions 
to take excessive risk, given the protection of limited liability.  During the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, many banks operated under liability rules which obligated 
shareholders to bear larger costs of bank insolvency in the form of contingent, or even 
unlimited liability. This paper examines the empirical relationship between the size of banks’ 
contingent liability and their risk-taking behavior using data on British banks from 1878-1912. 
We find that banks with more contingent liability appear to have taken less risk. We also find 
evidence that the risk-reducing effects of contingent liability were larger for banks with higher 
leverage, suggesting that contingent capital mitigated moral hazard problem at banks. 
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1.  Introduction 
  From the enactment of the first commercial banking codes in the nineteenth century to 
the adoption of the Basel and Basel II accords in recent years, to the anticipated 
implementation of Basel III, policy makers have argued that holding increased amounts of 
capital promotes bank “soundness and stability” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
1988, 2004).
4  Capital has several stability-enhancing properties.  First, unlike debt, equity 
provides a buffer against a shortfall in cash flow: if earnings fall, dividends can be suspended 
without catastrophic consequences, freeing up funds to pay depositors and other creditors.
5   
Second, if a bank is forced to close, capital serves as a reserve that can be called upon to 
liquidate unpaid debts. Third, greater holdings of capital can encourage banks to undertake 
less risk: because the capital may be partially or completely wiped out if the firm fails, banks 
have an incentive not to take risks that might put them out of business.
6  Fourth, because 
banks know more about their operations than their investors (information asymmetry), the 
decision to hold more capital—i.e., to subject owners to a greater loss in case of failure—can 
signal to depositors and investors that the bank will undertake less risk than it otherwise 
might.
7  
  Although the stabilizing role of bank capital is widely recognized by economists and 
policy-makers, establishing a regulatory framework that ensures that banks have sufficient 
                                                           
4 Bank capital (or lack thereof) played an important role in making the banking system vulnerable to systemic 
shocks during the recent financial crisis. See Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche (2010).  
5 Debt service cannot be so easily suspended.  This is especially important, given that banks are among the most 
highly leveraged firms in the world:  the average debt-to-equity ratio in US agriculture is about one; the average 
in manufacturing is about two; the average in banking is over nine.  Troy (2004). 
6 This presupposes that the incentives of bank managers shareholders are aligned (i.e., assuming no principal-
agent problem). Glassman and Rhodes (1980). The incentive effect can be even more powerful when shareholder 
liability is not limited (Grossman 2001a). 
7 Finally, banks hold capital because government regulations force them to do so. Such government regulation is 
typically justified on the grounds that it promotes soundness and stability in the banking sector: that is, for all the 
reasons cited above.    3
capital to weather large shocks has proven difficult.  The value of bank capital changes over 
time and is notoriously difficult to measure given the inherent opacity of bank assets.  The 
historical experience suggests that the difficulty in measuring bank capital may create an 
environment in which regulators are tempted to grant forbearance to insolvent banks (e.g., the 
US Saving and Loans Crisis in the 1980s and Japan’s decade-long banking crisis in the 
1990s).
8  It has also been emphasized that bank capital regulation may be circumvented 
because of the strong influence of political capture (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2006). 
  The earliest national banking codes, enacted in Canada, England, Finland, Japan, 
Sweden, and the United States, established minimum capital requirements ranging from just 
over £5000 to as much as £100,000.  Even before governments began to mandate explicit 
minimum capital requirements, law, custom, and market forces led to alternative means for 
providing sufficient levels of capital as an additional protection for bank creditors, primarily 
though extended shareholder liability.
9   
  The oldest and most well-known system of extended liability is unlimited liability, 
under which partners bear unlimited liability for the obligations of a failed firm.  In England 
and Sweden, banks that issued currency during the nineteenth century were typically subject 
to unlimited liability.
10  In the United States, state law often mandated that banks chartered 
under their authority be subject to “double” liability: that is, in case of the bank’s failure, 
shareholders would be liable for twice the amount they had originally paid for their shares; 
some states mandated “triple” liability.
11   
                                                           
8 See, for example, Kane (1989) on the S&L crisis and Fukao (2003) on the Japanese experience. 
9 See Berger, Herring, and Szegő (1995) on market capital requirements. 
10 By contrast, in countries in which government-sponsored central banks maintained a monopoly on note issue, 
banks were frequently incorporated with the same liability rules as governed non-financial corporations.  
Grossman (2001b).  
11 Technically, shareholders of such a bank were liable to pay in an additional amount equal to the par value of 
their shares (shareholders subject to triple liability would be liable for an additional payment equal to twice the   4
Theory predicts that extended liability will reduce the opportunity to shift risk to debt 
holders (e.g., depositors), since bank owners under such a regime are obligated by law to 
shoulder failure costs that are potentially well in excess of the initial equity contributed.  
Figure 1 illustrates shareholder payoffs under a variety of liability rules.  In all cases, there is 
no upward limit on shareholder returns: positive returns on investment projects (i.e., higher 
firm value) lead to higher share value without limit.  Under unlimited liability, the negative 
returns to shareholders are also unlimited, implying that the shareholders give equal weight to 
both tails of asset returns when evaluating investment decision.
12  Under limited liability, 
negative returns to shareholders are limited to the amount of paid-in capital, thereby altering 
the bank’s risk preference:  if bank returns are normally distributed (with a mean of zero), 
bank owners operating under limited liability can increase their expected return by engaging 
in higher-risk projects (i.e., those with a higher variance). Such risk-shifting incentives are 
mitigated by contingent liability, since it raises the size of the potential negative payoff to 
shareholders.  Thus, banks operating with larger amounts of contingent liability should give 
greater weight to the extremes of the tails of the returns—hence, avoiding high-variance (i.e., 
high-risk) projects. Esty (1998) and Grossman (2001a) demonstrate that such strict liability 
rules historically played an important role in reducing moral hazard problem in the US 
banking sector. 
  In this paper, we consider another mechanism for imposing contingent liability upon 
bank shareholders which was common in Britain during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century: uncalled capital.  Under this system, firms issued equity with a nominal 
value, all or part of which might have been required to be paid in by subscribers at the time of 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
par value of their shares).  To the extent that the market value differed from the par value and the purchase price, 
the terms “double liability” and “triple liability” are misnomers.  Grossman (2001a). 
12 In practice, however, shareholders’ liability is limited to their wealth--even under unlimited liability.   5
the initial offering.  Shares which were only partly paid carried with them a contingent 
liability for the unpaid portion and could be called in by the firm at the management’s 
discretion.  As in the case of unlimited and double liability, such extended liability should 
induce bank shareholders to become more risk averse.
13  Even in the absence of an actual 
capital call, the threat of such a call might render shares with uncalled liability less liquid 
which, in turn, would give shareholders additional incentive to monitor managers for 
excessive risk-taking.  The goal of this paper is to determine whether greater levels of 
uncalled capital, in fact, reduced bank risk-taking. 
  Examining the consequences of uncalled liability fills a substantial gap in the scholarly 




16--in part, as a result of the subprime crisis and its aftershocks—there 
has been little systematic empirical work specifically examining the historical experience with 
unpaid capital.
17  Contingent liability also offers advantages over other forms of extended 
liability, particularly in terms of the tractability of empirical analysis.  Unlike unlimited 
liability, although similar to double and triple liability, the extent of liability with uncalled 
capital is explicitly stated; in the case of unlimited liability, the contingent liability could well 
exceed the total wealth of some shareholders, as it famously did during the failure of the City 
                                                           
13 Although unlimited liability and double liability superficially resemble the extended liability provisions of 
uncalled capital, in fact, there are important differences.  Both limited liability and double liability formally come 
into play only if the institution in question is being wound up.  Shareholders in both types of firms can be 
solicited for additional funds--either to bolster a foundering firm or to promote growth of a healthy one—
however, they are under no obligation to do so.  On the other hand, those owning shares with unpaid capital are 
obligated to meet capital calls under all circumstances, whether or not the firm is in liquidation.  Because calling 
up uncalled capital of an on-going concern is much simpler than calling upon unlimited or double liability in the 
case of bankruptcy—which involves a court procedure—it is, in a sense, a less rare occurrence and one which 
shareholders are therefore more likely to anticipate 
14 Halpern et al (1980), Easterbrook and Fischel (1985), Carr and Mathewson (1988), Hansmann and Kraakman 
(1991, 1992a, 1992b), Grossman (1995), Hickson and Turner (2003a, 2003b, 2005), Acheson and Turner (2006).  
15 Macey and Miller (1992, 1993), Jackson (1993), Wilson and Kane (1996), Esty (1998), and Grossman (2001a, 
2007). 
16 Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008), Flannery (2009). 
17 See, however, Nanjo and Kasuya (2009).     6
of Glasgow Bank in 1879.  Further, unlike double or triple liability, the extent of uncalled 
liability varied from firm to firm, allowing a more systematic assessment of its effects.  
Finally, given recent interest shown by policy makers in extended liability, the historical 
examination may yield insight for current-day policy.
18   
  Our work also ties in with an extensive literature on the importance of liability 
structure.  The Coase Theorem (1960) argues that in the absence of transactions costs as long 
as property rights—or, in this case, liability obligations—are clearly assigned, the market can 
effectively price their effects and thereby render liability structure irrelevant.  Grossman’s 
(1995) case study of American Express, an unlimited liability company, shows that its shares 
were just as actively traded—and not viewed as excessively risky in comparison with those of 
limited liability companies--suggesting that the liability structure did not have important 
effects on market outcomes.  Similarly, Acheson and Turner (2008b) do not find any 
discernible difference in the liquidity of shares of limited liability and extended liability banks 
in the nineteenth century Britain.  Our study differs from previous work in that it looks in 
detail at the balance sheet characteristics of banks under different liability rules and assess 
whether liability structure had effects on banks’ risk taking behavior.
19  
Briefly, we find that, on average, banks with larger amounts of contingent liability 
tended to be more conservative.  That is, they held less risky assets and their loan portfolios 
grew more slowly than banks with less uncalled capital.  Notably, these effects are larger for 
banks with smaller amounts of paid-in capital at stake, suggesting that contingent capital 
mitigated the moral hazard problem at banks that were less well-positioned to weather 
negative shocks to the value of their assets.  Our results are analogous to those of Esty (1998) 
                                                           
18 See, for example, Ashcraft (2004) on the Federal Reserve’s “source of strength” doctrine. 
19 Unlike Acheson and Turner (2008b), we do not focus specifically on the liquidity of bank shares.   7
and Grossman (2001a) who find that double liability rules in the US worked to restrain 
excessive risk-taking by banks.  We also infer from these results that liability structure indeed 
“mattered” in the pre-war British banking sector.
20 
   
 
2.  The evolution of contingent liability in law and practice 
  The first joint stock bank in Britain was the Bank of England, which was established 
in 1694.
21  Prior to that, banking services had been rendered by a number of different agents, 
including scriveners, goldsmiths, moneylenders, and participants in the daily meetings of 
London merchants, although none had received any charter, sanction, or official recognition 
from the government.  In 1708, during the War of Spanish Succession, in return for a fresh 
loan to the government, a new charter was granted which, among its other provisions, 
prohibited associations of more than six individuals from carrying on a banking business in 
England and Wales.
22  Thus, for the next 118 years, all banks with the exception of the Bank 
of England were partnerships with unlimited liability. 
  Banking crises in the early nineteenth century brought home to policy makers the 
fragility of a banking system composed primarily of small banks.  This realization, combined 
with the declining importance of the Bank of England in funding government expenditures, 
led to the passage of a series of laws which gradually eroded the Bank’s monopoly on joint 
stock banking (Broz and Grossman 2004, Grossman 2010).  An 1826 law allowed the 
                                                           
20 One way in which our results can be reconciled with those of Acheson and Turner (2008b) is to argue that at 
the equilibrium, banks with extended liability might have made deliberate choices to invest in less risky assets, 
thereby reducing the probability of liability calls and raising the attractiveness of their shares.  
21 This section deals almost exclusively with the liability laws affecting banks.  Hunt (1936) and Cook (1950) 
discuss the development of corporation law more broadly. 
22 The 1742 charter specifically enunciated the Bank’s “privilege of exclusive banking.”   Crick and Wadsworth 
(1936: 11), Thomas (1934: 15).   8
establishment of note-issuing joint stock banks outside of a 65-mile radius of London.  By 
1833, joint stock banks without note-issuing privileges were allowed within the 65-mile 
exclusion zone.  Although these laws were viewed as something of a watershed at the time in 
that they allowed the formation of banking corporations, their provisions were quite modest: 
no minimum capital requirements were specified, nor were banking corporations granted 
limited liability. 
  Two pieces of legislation in 1844 further changed the character of English banking, 
both regularizing the mechanism for creating joint stock banks and setting limits upon bank 
activities in order to reduce the riskiness of their operations.
23  The better known of these was 
the Bank Charter Act (also known as Peel’s Act, after the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel) 
which, among other things, began the process—continued over several decades--of 
centralizing the banknote issue within the Bank of England.  Because banknotes are highly 
liquid, and subject to over-issue, by gradually removing the privilege of note issue from 
commercial banks, the law reduced their exposure to banknote-related risk.  And, when banks 
were eventually allowed to incorporate with limited liability, remaining note-issues were 
exempted from the limited liability provision. 
  The second piece of legislation was the Joint Stock Banking Act.  This law established 
England’s first banking code and specified a detailed set of regulations governing the 
establishment and management of joint stock banks.  Minimum share denominations were to 
be £100, in order to encourage shareholding by the wealthy individuals who would be able to 
afford future capital calls.  The law also introduced minimum capital requirements: banks had 
to have £100,000 in subscribed capital, half of which had to be paid up before they could 
begin operation.   
                                                           
23 The text of both laws is reprinted in Gregory (1929).   9
  In some sense, the notion of “uncalled capital” in an unlimited liability bank is 
counterintuitive: if liability is joint and several, then individual partners can be sued for the 
debts of the partnership as a whole and liability will not be limited to the amount of uncalled 
capital.  Nonetheless, uncalled capital may have served an important role: the unlimited 
liability of partners would only be relevant in the case of a liquidation of the firm; uncalled 
capital could be called in under much less dire conditions.   
  The provisions of the Joint Stock Banking Act were severe relative to existing law:  no 
new joint stock bank was established during the subsequent five years and only seven were 
formed during the 13 years following its enactment, compared with well over 100 established 
formed during the previous 13-year period.  The 1857 Joint Sock Banking Companies Act 
repealed the code of 1844, essentially subjecting banks to the new joint stock company law 
(which had been enacted the previous year), aside from its limited liability provisions.  
Legislation in the following year granted joint stock banks the right to incorporate with 
limited liability.  Consolidating legislation enacted in 1862 made limited liability readily 
available for banks and also eliminated the £100 minimum share denomination. 
  The changes in banking law led to the rapid growth of limited liability banking, both 
through the establishment of new institutions and the conversion of unlimited liability banks 
into limited liability institutions.  Nonetheless, many of the larger, well-established joint stock 
banks were reluctant to incorporate under limited liability (Crick and Wadsworth 1936: 32-
33).  By 1870, there were approximately 80 joint stock banks in England and Wales, with total 
market capitalization of £52 million (about 4.5% of British GDP).  At the end of 1913, there 
were less than 45 joint stock banks in England and Wales, with a combined market 
capitalization of about £160 million (about 5.9% of British GDP).     10
  The failure of the unlimited City of Glasgow Bank in 1878 again raised the question of 
the advisability of limited liability banking.
24  One of the reactions was the passage of the 
Companies Act of 1879, which instituted the principle of “Reserved Liability.”
25  Section 5 of 
the Act allowed banks, both limited and unlimited, to divide their uncalled capital into two 
parts, one to be callable at the discretion of the directors and a second as “reserved liability,” 
only to be called up in the event that the firm was wound up.
26  Under the terms of the Act, 
unlimited liability banks were allowed to increase their nominal capital, as long as the entire 
increase was allocated to reserved liability.  Both limited and unlimited banks could reclassify 
a portion of their uncalled capital as reserve liability.  Many banks took advantage of this in 
the subsequent decade (Gregory 1936 I: 206ff).
27  
  The greatest risk to shareholders with contingent liability was that part or all of the 
uncalled capital could be called.  If the firm’s liquidation was handled by the bankruptcy 
court, shareholders became parties to the case and could be compelled to pay the uncalled 
capital by the court.  Uncalled liability, along with high share denomination, was seen as 
ensuring that shares remained in the hands of the well-to-do, who would be willing and able to 
monitor the activities of managers and cautious in how the business was run.  According to 
Jefferys (1938 [1977]: 174-5): 
The very existence of a large uncalled portion on each share was a direct incentive to 
interest in the activities of the company.  If there was any doubt about the honest 
                                                           
24 This development had a parallel with developments among non-banking firms following the Overend, Gurney 
crisis of 1866.  The 1867 Companies Act allowed companies to reduce their capital and share values, thereby 
reducing the proportion of unpaid capital.  Few older companies took advantage of this provision, although 
newer companies tended to issue shares of lower denomination with a small unpaid portion.  Jefferys (1946: 46). 
25 Crick and Wadsworth (1936: 33), Gregory (1936 I: 204ff).  Another important part of this Act (section 7) 
mandated periodic independent audits.  
26  Our results are qualitatively similar if we treat reserved liability independently of uncalled liability, although 
they are less statistically robust than the results with total uncalled liability, suggesting that total uncalled liability 
mattered more than reserve liability.       
27  As joint stock banking matured, a further important trend that may have affected bank risk-taking was the 
development and growing acceptance of “conservative” banking principles (Kennedy 1987, Collins 1989).   11
running of the concern, or the promises of the prospectus not being fulfilled, the 
shareholders attempted to use legal methods to absolve them of the necessity of paying 
up their shares.  
 
And, in fact, two shareholders in Overend, Gurney sued—unsuccessfully--to have their names 
removed from the roster of shareholders in the wake of capital calls made on their shares after 
the firm’s failure due to gross mismanagement (Campbell 1895: 879ff.). 
  Even in the absence of liquidation or an actual capital call, uncalled liability could 
impose substantial costs upon shareholders, particularly in the liquidity of shares and in their 
usefulness as collateral.  Testifying in the aftermath of the Overend, Gurney crisis, banker and 
statistician William Newmarch presented the example of a company founded with £50 shares, 
the management of which subsequently realized that it only required £25 to be paid in: 
There is then an uncalled margin of £25, which hangs over the heads of the persons 
who are on the register of the company, and looking at the events of the last nine or ten 
months, the practical result is, that shares in the kind of companies mentioned have 
become almost entirely unmarketable, and for the very obvious reason that the buyer, 
while he will be perfectly content to embark in a concern where £25 is paid up, where 
only £5 or £10 more can in any way be called up, he is exceedingly unwilling to 
embark in a concern where the uncalled liability is represented by £25 per share. 
(Parliament (1867: Q. 525)) 
 
I should think that at this moment there is between 20 and 30 millions of actually paid-
up money, which is more or less in a state of suspended animation, in consequence of 
the unmarketable character of the shares. (Q. 528) 
 
This view was reinforced by Manchester merchant and Salford mayor, Henry Pochin: 
I think that [overhanging liability] is a great public damage; the shares of many 
companies are incapable of being negotiated in any form, the property being as far as 
paid-up capital is concerned, just as unavailable as if it were at the bottom of the sea.  
It cannot be dealt with; it cannot be sold in the market.  No banker will look at it, and 
the consequences are very serious and very considerable, having regard to what I 
believe to be the real value of those shares (Q. 2298) 
   12
He argued that bankers would not take securities with uncalled liability as collateral for loans, 
since if the borrowers defaulted, the bank would have to seize the contingent liability, which 
might outweigh the value of the shares (Q. 2311).
28   
  Uncalled liability was also useful for companies attempting to raise capital under less 
dire circumstances.  Rather than calling in capital, the management employed uncalled capital 
in two ways: (1) as collateral for bank loans or for debentures to be sold in securities markets; 
and (2) by issuing new shares with lower amounts of paid-up capital.  The Shareholder 
Guardian (August 12, 1864) complained that: “The pernicious practice has grown up 
whenever additional working capital is required, of not making calls on the existing shares but 




3.  Data  
Bank balance sheet data on banks of England and Wales from 1877-1912 were 
gathered from the Economist banking supplement;
30 share data were taken from the Investor’s 
Monthly Manual (IMM), which published comprehensive tables on securities traded on 
British—and some foreign--exchanges.
31  The IMM did not include separate tables for stocks 
and bonds, and so distinguishing debt from equity is not a straightforward exercise.
32  Annual 
                                                           
28 He further noted that those who held such shares felt compelled to leave funds that could otherwise be used in 
profitable endeavors lying idle in the bank as insurance against calls (Q. 2301). 
29 We intend to take up the consequences of this form of raising additional capital in future work. 
30 The Economist banking supplement began reporting consistent bank balance sheet data in October 1877.  Our 
analysis starts in 1878 to allow a one year lag to avoid endogeneity problems.  Our results are unaffected if the 
analysis begins in 1883, after most banks had adopted limited liability.  We restricted our sample to banks in 
England and Wales because Scottish and Irish banks operated under a different legal framework. 
31 Grossman (2002: 124-126, 144) presents a more complete description of IMM data. 
32 Fixed income securities were sometimes distinguishable by the title of the issue (which might, for example, 
include a maturity or an interest rate) or by listing the nominal amount of the issue rather than the number of 
shares in the column titled “number of shares or amount of stock” (i.e., £100,000 versus 100,000) or by the 
designation “stock” rather than an amount in the column devoted to the nominal amount of the share.  It is   13
data on ordinary shares were gathered from the December issue of the IMM, including the 
number of shares outstanding, the nominal amount of each share, and the amount paid-in on 
each share.  We also collected monthly data on share prices from this source so as to compute 
the volatility of share prices. Information was not collected on shares for which any of this 
information was omitted in the IMM.
33 
At the time of establishment, company promoters declared the nominal amount of the 
firm’s capital, the number of shares into which it would be divided, and the portion of each 
share that would be paid-in by subscribers.
34  For example, a firm might be established with 
£1,000,000 capital divided into 10,000 shares of £100 each, with £50 pounds per share paid-
in.  Upon issue, subscribers would pay £50, with another £50 payable (i.e., uncalled capital) at 
the discretion of the directors.
35  
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century there were no statutory 
requirements as regards share denominations or proportion of shares paid up.  These were, 
rather, determined by the organizers at the outset.  Frequently, organizers stated how much 
they intended to call up of a firm’s nominal capital in the firm’s prospectus, although it is 
unlikely that these intentions were legally binding.  The proportion of capital paid up varied 
for a variety of reasons, including common practice within an industry and current opinion as 
to what share characteristics were conducive to promoting financial stability (Jefferys 1946: 
46-48).  
                                                                                                                                                                                      
possible that some securities that carried the designation “stock” in the amount column were, in fact, fully paid 
£100 shares and so the data presented in this section may not represent all fully paid shares.  We are grateful to 
John Turner for clarifying the IMM nomenclature. 
33 A missing latest price suggests that the share was not actively traded in the month. 
34 These were considered among the most crucial decisions made by company promoters.  Jefferys (1946: 45) 
notes that by “the eighties and nineties these considerations were no longer to the fore.” 
35 Under the Joint Stock Bank Act of 1844, a nominal share amount of £100 with £50 paid in would have been 
common.  These minimum share denomination and paid-in requirements were eliminated in 1862.   14
Figure 2 presents data on the extent of uncalled capital, as measured by the ratio of 
uncalled to paid-in capital, in banks, insurance companies, mining companies, and land, 
mortgage, and finance companies during 1870-1913, as well as an average for all firms listed 
on the London Stock Exchange.  The data for calculating the ratios, as well as the sector 
classifications, are taken from the IMM.   The ratio is weighted by firm size: that is, the ratio 
is the sum of all uncalled capital in the sector divided by the sum of total nominal capital.
36  
Figure 2 illustrates the relatively high amount of uncalled capital maintained by banks, 
insurance, and land, mortgage, and financial companies relative to the market as a whole.  The 
high proportion of uncalled capital can be seen as a market-imposed requirement to engender 
confidence in sectors where leverage was high and the physical assets were either meager or 
inaccessible to creditors.  Insurance companies, which like banks had large potential 
liabilities, had not been permitted to register as limited liability firms until 1862.   
Figure 2 can be interpreted as suggesting that the introduction of reserved liability in 
1880 increased in the relative amount of uncalled capital.  In the course of establishing 
reserved liability, many banks raised the nominal value of their capital without changing the 
paid-in amount.  During the entire period, changes in paid-in capital that were not associated 
with a stock split or with a change in the nominal capital of a firm were no more common in 




                                                           
36 Mining is included because, like the three financial sectors, the amount of uncalled capital was high relative to 
the average of the entire market. 
37 It is impossible to determine from our data precisely how often capital was called, since such calls may have 
been partially disguised by stock splits or by the issuance of new shares.  Nonetheless, we estimate capital calls 
by years in which the change in uncalled capital was equal and opposite to the change in the amount of paid-in 
capital.  By this measure, the number of capital calls was not great—about 2.2 percent of bank-year 
observations—and fell by 0.13 calls per year.   15
4. Methodology 
Our working hypothesis is that the more capital bank owners have at stake, the greater 
their incentive to avoid risk.
38  Shareholders in banks operating under unlimited liability—
which we capture with a dummy variable--have the greatest potential loss (all of their 
personal assets) and should, in theory, be the most risk-averse.
39  Shareholders in banks 
operating under limited liability have at stake the total amount of equity capital, measured by 
the ratio of market value of capital to total assets: the smaller the capital-to-asset ratio, the 
greater incentive for risk-taking.
40  Finally, bank owners also have contingent liability, which 
we measure in two ways: (1) by the amount of uncalled capital relative to the book value of 
subscribed capital; and (2)  by the amount of uncalled capital relative to the value of paid-in 
capital.
41 
  We measure bank risk—our dependent variable--in four ways.  First, following 
Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) and Esty (1998), among others, we use the volatility of 
share prices.  More specifically, we compute the standard deviation of monthly changes in 
share prices for a given year for each bank, which we match up with annual data on bank 
                                                           
38  If the interests of managers and shareholders are not aligned, there may be principal-agent problems 
(Glassman and Rhoades 1980).  Such incentive incompatibility contributed to the 1878 failure of the City of 
Glasgow Bank.  Most British banks required directors to hold a minimal number of shares, potentially mitigating 
this problem (Acheson and Turner 2008a:244). 
39 Unlimited liability companies are not, of course, completely unlimited, but are limited by the wealth of their 
shareholders, which is not known with precision by the market at any moment.  Dropping unlimited liability 
companies from our analysis does not substantively alter our results. The results are not reported to conserve 
space but are available from the authors upon request. 
40 We also use the ratio of paid-in capital (in book value) to assets to measure capital-to-asset ratio as a 
robustness check, as well as the level of capital and reserves. The results are qualitatively similar, and thus not 
reported to conserve space. 
41 There is no correct method for specifying the denominator in a measure of contingent capital.  We focus our 
attention the ratios of uncalled liability to subscribed capital and to paid-in capital, which seem to have been the 
focus of market participants at the time.  One could also measure uncalled capital relative to market 
capitalization, since as market valuations increased a given amount of uncalled would have decreased in 
importance to shareholders.  We have experimented with this measure, although the results are generally not 
significant.   16
liability characteristics.
42  This measure has several limitations.  First, some banks are 
privately owned, and thus their shares are not traded; we drop these banks from our sample.  
Second, even when banks are publicly traded, shares are not transacted every month, 
presumably because these shares are not especially liquid.  Following Esty (1998), we screen 
out bank-year observations in which fewer than 11 prices are observed (out of 12 months).
43  
After dropping the 580 observations for the reasons discussed above, we are left with 2636 
bank-year observations that contain information on capital-to-asset ratio, liability status 
(limited or unlimited), and the amount of contingent capital.
44  
  Another potential problem with this measure is that contingent liability makes shares 
riskier, since compared with limited liability, equity holders with contingent liability face 
wider range of returns for a given asset risk (Esty 1998).  Hence, given this direct positive 
effects of contingent liability on share price volatility, even if contingent liability reduces 
asset risk (which in turn reduces the volatility of share price returns), the net effect of these 
competing mechanisms is theoretically ambiguous.  
  Because of the limitation of share price volatility, we also use three alternative 
measures of risk-taking from bank balance sheets: the ratio of loans to total assets, the ratio of 
cash to total assets, and the rate of growth of assets.  Our assumption is that loans are riskier 
and less liquid—and that cash is less risky and more liquid--than other balance sheet assets, 
                                                           
42 One possible objection to this procedure is the assumption that the true volatility of prices can be captured only 
with 12 observations. As a check, we compute standard deviation based on 24 month of share price data to 
construct bi-annual panel. The results are qualitatively similar. 
43 The results are qualitatively similar without this screen or with a less stringent screen (e.g., dropping bank-year 
observations in which fewer than 10 prices are observed).  We also limited analysis to the largest 25 percent, 50 
percent, and 75 percent of all banks (by size or number of shareholders) in order to eliminate the possibility that 
the share prices of less frequently traded banks were more likely to be subject to manipulation.  This did not 
substantially alter our results. 
44 Because the data are panel, we adjust standard errors by using STATA’s cluster option.   17
primarily securities.
45  Banks with substantial contingent liabilities should have a smaller 
proportion of their assets in loans and a larger proportion of their assets in cash than limited 
liability banks if the risk-reducing incentive of contingent liability is strong.  We also measure 
risk-taking by the rate at which a bank’s assets expand in a given year under the theory that, 
all other things being equal, banks that engage in riskier activities will grow more rapidly than 
banks behaving in a more conservative manner (Calomiris 1990, Grossman 2001a, 2007).  
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A1. 
With these four measures of risk as dependent variables, we estimate the following 
regression equation: 
01 2 3   it it it it it Risk Capital Unlimited Contingent Liability         
Since all three factors reduce the incentive for banks to take risk, we expect the coefficients on 
each of these variables to be negative. All specifications include year specific effects.
46 
Standard errors are clustered by banks. 
In addition to this basic specification, we control for bank size (measured by log of 
assets, the number of branches, and establishment year, to be sure that the factors that are 
correlated with bank risk are not driving our results. Table A2 show the structure of 
correlations among these variables  It is noteworthy that uncalled liability is positively 
correlated with both bank size and the number of branches and negatively correlated with 
establishment year, indicating that large and old banks with diversified branch network is 
more likely to issue shares with uncalled liabilities. Controlling for these factors, thus, is 
                                                           
45 We also attempted to use the fraction of the asset portfolio in cash and government securities, however, the 
IMM doesn’t provide data on government securities holdings until relatively late in the period, rendering this 
approach impractical. 
46 As a first pass at the data, we ran several specifications with bank fixed effects, but the results are all 
insignificant largely due to the fact that the independent variables do not have rich within-bank variation.  As a 
result, we focus only on the results without bank fixed effects but with year fixed effects.   18
likely to be important in order to estimate the independent effects of uncalled  liability as there 
are likely to be important difference among banks of different size (i.e., it might just be the 
case that large (or old) banks were more likely to adopt conservative asset portfolio in order to 
preserve their reputational capital).  
When data are available, we also insert regional dummy variables to control for bank 
location.   It is likely that the geographical factors (e.g., industrial structure, growth 
opportunities, intensity of bank competition, etc.) affect bank risk, and thus omitting them 
may cause bias in the estimated effects of uncalled liability on risk-taking.  
  
5. Results 
     The results based on share price volatility are presented in Table 1. Columns 1-6 use 
the ratio of uncalled capital to paid-up capital as our measure of contingent liability, and 
columns 7-12 employ the ratio of uncalled capital to subscribed (nominal) capital.  
 As predicted, share price volatility is typically negatively correlated with the capital-
to-asset ratio (i.e., share price volatility is larger for more highly leveraged banks).  Although 
this result is consistent with the view that a bank with higher capital-to-asset ratio makes more 
prudent decisions, it might also be driven in part by a simple mechanism that higher leverage 
causes greater share price volatility.  The coefficients on contingent liability and unlimited 
liability, however, are for the most part not statistically significant.  This result contrasts with 
that of Esty (1998), which shows that the strict liability rule is correlated with lower share 
price volatility. Our results suggest that in the case of British banks during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, the risk-reducing effects of a strict liability rule might not have 
been large enough to offset its direct positive effects on share price volatility.   19
  The results based on loan-to-asset ratio are displayed in Table 2.  Column 1 shows that 
the loan-to-assets ratio is strongly negatively correlated with the amount of contingent 
liability, measured as the ratio of uncalled liability to subscribed capital.  A similar correlation 
is present when we employ the ratio of uncalled liability to paid-in capital as our measure of 
uncalled liability (column 7). These results are statistically robust even when we control for 
the capital-to-assets ratio and a dummy variable for unlimited liability (columns 2), bank size 
(column 3), the number of branches (column 4) and establishment year (column 5).  When we 
include location dummies, the results turn insignificant (column 6) as the standard error rises, 
although the point estimate is similar. When contingent liabilities are measured in relation to 
paid-in capital, the estimated coefficients on contingent liability are not significant in some 
specifications (columns 9-12), however they are qualitatively similar. 
  The estimated risk-reducing effects of contingent liability are economically important: 
based on columns 1-6, comparing a bank with no contingent liability (i.e., (amount-
par)/amount=0) with a bank with equal amounts of  contingent and paid-up capital ((amount-
par)/amount=0.5), the latter’s loan-to-asset ratio is, on average, 6 – 8.5 percentage points less 
than that of the former.  Taken as a group, these results suggest that extension of bank owners’ 
liability beyond the paid-in amount played an important role in restraining banks from 
excessive risk-taking.   
Interestingly, the loan-to-asset ratio is positively correlated with the capital-to-asset 
ratio, suggesting that well-capitalized banks seem to have taken more risk than poorly 
capitalized banks.  One possible explanation is that markets demanded higher capital-to-asset 
ratios from banks holding more opaque assets (i.e., loans).  The coefficient on unlimited   20
liability is not significantly different from zero, although its signs are generally negative, as 
expected. 
The results using the cash-to-asset ratio as the dependent variable are displayed in 
Table 3.  When measured by the ratio of uncalled capital to paid-in capital, contingent liability 
is positively correlated with cash-to-asset ratio (column 7); these results are generally robust. 
Hence, the balance sheet of banks with contingent liability tended to be less risky and more 
liquid.  Interestingly, the cash-to-asset ratio is negatively correlated with the capital-to-asset 
ratio and unlimited liability status in some specifications.  Again, it might be the case that 
markets demand higher capital-to-asset ratio and unlimited liability from a bank with illiquid 
balance sheet. 
  Table 4 shows the results for asset growth. In two specification (columns 5 and 6), 
contingent liability is negatively correlated with asset growth, however, this result is not 
robust. Nonetheless, the results strongly indicate that the other forms of risk capital made 




In addition to estimating the average effects of contingent capital on bank risk-taking, 
we also examine the interactive effects of these measures.  Theory predicts that the effects of 
unlimited liability and contingent liability are heterogeneous, depending on how leveraged a 
bank is.  One the one hand, when leverage is high and insolvency more likely, a bank with no 
extended liability has strong incentives to take risk which can be effectively shifted onto debt 
holders.  With large extended liability that could adversely affect personal wealth of bank   21
equity holders in case of insolvency, however, such risk-shifting incentives are attenuated.  
On the other hand, when leverage is low and insolvency is unlikely, extended liability is 
unlikely to be demanded and thus less relevant to the bank’s choice of asset risk.  Hence, the 
effects of extended liability on bank risk-taking depend crucially on capital-to-asset ratio. 
 Econometrically, we look at the interaction of contingent capital and unlimited 
liability with the capital-to-asset ratio. These interactions capture the possibility that extended 
liability is less relevant when banks are more adequately capitalized.  We therefore expect 
both to have positive and statistically significant coefficients. 
Another important dimension of nonlinearity is the interaction of bank size with 
uncalled liability.  The basic interpretation of our main results is that a stricter liability rule 
creates an incentive for bank shareholders to be more concerned about asset risk. However, 
when a bank is large and owned by many small shareholders, they might face serious free-
rider problems since each shareholder cannot fully appropriate the economic benefit of her 
monitoring efforts. Since bank size and co-ordination costs of shareholder monitoring are 
likely to be positively correlated, we expect that the effects of extended liability should 
depend on bank size as well. To capture this possible nonlinearity, we interact firm size with 
contingent liability, which should have a positive coefficient. 
  The results are presented in Table 5.  As expected, the interaction of bank size with 
contingent liability is positive and significant, suggesting that the marginal impact of strict 
liability rules was smaller for larger banks. The results thus provide some evidence that the 
strength of corporate governance might have been an important intervening factor that could 
have affected the efficacy of uncalled capital as an instrument for risk control.  As expected, 
the coefficient on the interaction of capital-to-asset ratio and contingent liability is positive   22
and significant while that on (un-interacted) contingent liability remains negative.  Thus, the 
risk-reducing effects of contingent liability seem to be highly nonlinear, depending upon a 
bank’s leverage (i.e., the amount of extended liability matters more when the capital-to-assets 
ratio is low).     
The results are again qualitatively important.  Based on column 1, for a bank with a 
relatively high capital-to-asset ratio (say 0.35, one standard deviation above the average), the 
impact of an increase in the ratio of contingent to subscribed capital from 0 to 0.5 (i.e., 
switching from limited liability to double liability) is only 0.5*(-0.474 + 0.35*1.273) = -0.015 
(and statistically insignificant), while for a bank with low capital-to-asset ratio (say 0.15, one 
standard deviation below the average) the effect of the same change in contingent capital is 
0.5*(-0.474 + 0.15*1.273) = -0.14.
47    This is consistent with the view that contingent liability 
keeps bankers from shifting risk to debt holders when their bank is near insolvency.  
  When the interaction of the capital-to-assets ratio with unlimited liability is included 
(column 2), the coefficient on (un-interacted) unlimited liability becomes larger (i.e., more 
negative) and statistically significant (in Table 4) while the coefficient on the interaction of 
the capital-to-assets ratio with unlimited liability is positive.  These results suggest that when 
banks are fully solvent with high capital-to-assets ratio, unlimited liability is irrelevant, 
whereas it plays an important role in reducing bank asset risk when capital asset ratio is low. 
Again the effects are economically important.  Based on column 2, for a well capitalized bank 
(capital-to-asset ratio = 0.35), the effect of converting from limited to unlimited liability is 
only -0.201 + 0.35*0.555 = -0.007, whereas for a poorly capitalized bank (capital-to-asset 
ratio = 0.15), the effect is -0.201 + 0.15*0.555 = -0.118.  
                                                           
47 We obtain similar calculation if we use the coefficient estimates on columns 3-8.   23
In sum, the risk-reducing effects of strict liability rules are larger among highly 
leveraged banks, since contingent capital and unlimited liability are irrelevant to risk-attitude 
of banks when the capital-to-assets ratio is so large that banks are unlikely to become 
insolvent (i.e., bank owners are unlikely to be called to provide contingent capital if banks are 
adequately capitalized).  
 
6.  Conclusion 
  Does imposing more strict liability rules make banks behave more prudently?  This 
paper exploits pre-World War I data, when British banks operated with varying levels of 
extended liability, to address this question.  Our results suggest that banks which operated 
under more strict liability rules—particularly more highly leveraged banks—undertook less 
risk than counterparts operating with lower levels of contingent liability.  These results are 
consistent with both the predictions of economic theory as well as the findings of an empirical 
literature that focuses on the consequences of double liability in the United States.  They are at 
odds with the Coase (1960) Theorem view that liability structure will be rendered irrelevant 
due to the market’s ability to price and trade it.  In short, liability structure “mattered.”  
  Although our interest is primarily historical, our results may have an important 
implication for current day policy makers: namely that extending bank shareholders’ liability-
-or by converting creditors into equity holders via contingent convertible bonds (Cocos)--can 
protect taxpayers by directly reducing their share of bank resolution costs and, more 
importantly, by altering the risk-shifting incentives of banks.   
Our results also suggest an agenda for research on British economic history. Although 
we document that liability rules had important effects on bank risk, it is not clear how bank   24
equity holders controlled managerial agency problems. In particular, the period in question is 
characterized by democratization of the British equity markets (Rutterford et al., 2001 and 
Acheson and Turner, 2011), which is likely to have led to more dispersed ownership structure 
and exacerbate agency problems. Thus, collecting the data on corporate governance structure 
and matching them to the data on liability structure is one fruitful step to opening up the 
“black box.”  Additionally, if the institution of extended liability functioned well as a device 
to mitigate the moral hazard problem in the British banking sector before WWI, what led to its 
decline and eventual demise? It might also be fruitful to probe the factors underlying the 
evolution of liability rules, as well the factors—e.g., convention, market—that determined 
individual firms’ contingent capital choices. 
    25
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Figure 2: Ratio of uncalled to paid-in capital, selected sectors, 1870-1913 
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Table 1: Standard Deviation of Share Price Return 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
VARIABLES 
                                      
(amount-par)/amount  0.00263 0.00230 0.00531 0.00548  0.0105 0.00266 
  (0.00772) (0.00693) (0.00703) (0.00707)  (0.0115)  (0.0166) 
(amount-par)/par  0.00139 0.00112 0.00133 0.00134 0.00191*  0.000725 
  (0.000928) (0.000930) (0.000912) (0.000913)  (0.00114)  (0.00244) 
Capital-to-Assets Ratio  -0.0528*** -0.0627*** -0.0630***  -0.0395**  -0.00737  -0.0498*** -0.0603*** -0.0607***  -0.0334**  -0.00711 
  (0.0167) (0.0192) (0.0195) (0.0193)  (0.0233)  (0.0175) (0.0193) (0.0196) (0.0164)  (0.0230) 
Unlimited Liability  -0.00474 -0.00426 -0.00427 -0.00354  -0.00959  -0.00427 -0.00386 -0.00389 -0.00331  -0.00890 
  (0.00879) (0.00900) (0.00911)  (0.0106) (0.00845)  (0.00880) (0.00899) (0.00910)  (0.0105) (0.00854) 
ln(Assets)  -0.00215**  -0.00202* -0.000704 -0.00177  -0.00240**  -0.00225* -0.000952 -0.00233 
  (0.00106) (0.00119) (0.00143)  (0.00230)  (0.00102) (0.00115) (0.00132)  (0.00324) 
Number of Branches  -3.33e-06 3.71e-07  -6.58e-06  -4.11e-06 4.02e-07  -3.20e-06 
  (1.18e-05) (1.30e-05) (1.29e-05)  (1.20e-05) (1.37e-05) (1.81e-05) 
Establishment Year  5.72e-05** -4.65e-05  6.10e-05** -4.93e-05 
  (2.66e-05) (2.83e-05)  (2.92e-05) (3.12e-05) 
Constant  0.0629***  0.0721***  0.107***  0.105*** -0.0451 0.146**  0.0602**  0.0695***  0.110***  0.108*** -0.0484  0.157* 
  (0.0236) (0.0237) (0.0294) (0.0292) (0.0576)  (0.0688)  (0.0231) (0.0234) (0.0291) (0.0289) (0.0597)  (0.0857) 
Location  dummy  no no no no no  yes  no no no no no  yes 
Observations  2,103 2,103 2,103 2,096 1,681  1,681  2,103 2,103 2,103 2,096 1,681  1,681 
R-squared  0.049 0.059 0.061 0.061 0.052  0.099  0.052 0.061 0.063 0.063 0.057  0.100 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: Loans-to-Assets Ratio 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11)  (12) 
VARIABLES 
                                      
(amount-par)/amount  -0.177*** -0.177***  -0.152**  -0.150***  -0.118*  -0.125 
  (0.0549) (0.0578) (0.0588) (0.0567)  (0.0680)  (0.0804) 
(amount-par)/par  -0.0118** -0.0105**  -0.00703  -0.00700  -0.00647  -0.0106 
  (0.00485) (0.00517) (0.00488)  (0.00476)  (0.00535) (0.00680) 
Capital-to-Assets Ratio  0.316** 0.257*  0.251*  0.351**  0.121  0.281**  0.203  0.200  0.292  0.118 
  (0.121)  (0.141) (0.137) (0.170) (0.134)  (0.124) (0.147) (0.143) (0.181) (0.133) 
Unlimited Liability  -0.0337 -0.0229 -0.0247  -0.0219  0.00126  -0.0229  -0.0108  -0.0124  -0.0149  0.00524 
  (0.0363)  (0.0330) (0.0333) (0.0343) (0.0235)  (0.0341) (0.0303) (0.0306) (0.0319) (0.0214) 
ln(Assets)  -0.0242** -0.0190  -0.0143  -0.00188  -0.0305***  -0.0257*  -0.0216 -0.000923 
  (0.0111) (0.0137) (0.0164) (0.0269)  (0.0113) (0.0144) (0.0178) (0.0270) 
Number of Branches  -0.000176 -0.000180 -6.69e-05  -0.000149 -0.000129 -9.63e-05 
  (0.000151) (0.000152) (0.000137)  (0.000153) (0.000152) (0.000151) 
Establishment Year  -7.79e-05 0.000434  -1.81e-05 0.000394 
  (0.000298) (0.000508)  (0.000297) (0.000500) 
Constant  0.708*** 0.653*** 1.040*** 0.981***  1.012  0.104  0.621*** 0.568***  1.065***  1.012***  0.969  0.122 
  (0.0451)  (0.0534)  (0.187) (0.213) (0.655) (1.159)  (0.0243)  (0.0367)  (0.201) (0.230) (0.687) (1.173) 
Location  dummy  no no no no  no yes no no  no  no  no yes 
Observations  2,630  2,630  2,630 2,622 2,090 2,090 2,621 2,621 2,621 2,613 2,081 2,081 
R-squared  0.130  0.171  0.208 0.214 0.212 0.584 0.122 0.154 0.209 0.213 0.220 0.577 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Cash-to-Assets Ratio 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
VARIABLES 
                                      
(amount-par)/amount  0.0318 0.0294 -0.00124  -0.00112  -0.00305 0.00517 
  (0.0290) (0.0299)  (0.0247)  (0.0248)  (0.0299)  (0.0321) 
(amount-par)/par  0.00584** 0.00537**  0.00258  0.00258  0.00367*  0.00432* 
  (0.00227) (0.00229) (0.00198) (0.00197) (0.00198) (0.00245) 
Capital-to-Assets Ratio  -0.0979** -0.0359  -0.0366  -0.0283  0.0316  -0.0882** -0.0331  -0.0340  -0.0183  0.0376 
  (0.0409) (0.0372) (0.0369) (0.0395)  (0.0532)  (0.0408) (0.0369) (0.0367)  (0.0379)  (0.0544) 
Unlimited Liability  -0.0122 -0.0236**  -0.0242** -0.0198*  -0.00322  -0.0116 -0.0213**  -0.0219**  -0.0164  0.00243 
  (0.0117) (0.00927)  (0.00936) (0.0105)  (0.0105)  (0.0110) (0.00902) (0.00907)  (0.0101)  (0.0101) 
ln(Assets)  0.0231*** 0.0230*** 0.0228***  0.0178***  0.0223*** 0.0223***  0.0218***  0.0155** 
  (0.00349) (0.00486) (0.00596)  (0.00612)  (0.00340) (0.00479)  (0.00586)  (0.00610) 
Number of Branches  2.40e-06 1.74e-05 1.66e-05  -1.89e-06 1.63e-05 3.42e-05 
  (7.04e-05) (7.61e-05) (7.82e-05)  (7.05e-05) (7.57e-05) (7.93e-05) 
Establishment Year  5.26e-05 0.000159  6.50e-05 0.000155 
  (0.000204) (0.000184)  (0.000201) (0.000182) 
Constant  0.177*** 0.196***  -0.169**  -0.168**  -0.273  -0.392  0.181***  0.198***  -0.164***  -0.165**  -0.296  -0.371 
  (0.0260) (0.0284)  (0.0653)  (0.0770)  (0.395)  (0.343)  (0.0166)  (0.0190)  (0.0602)  (0.0719)  (0.388)  (0.343) 
Location  dummy  no  no  no  no no yes no no no no no yes 
Observations  2,460  2,460  2,460  2,453 1,946 1,946 2,460 2,460 2,460 2,453 1,946 1,946 
R-squared  0.037  0.051  0.173  0.173 0.168 0.366 0.053 0.065 0.177 0.177 0.175 0.372 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
    34
Table 4: Asset Growth 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
VARIABLES                     
                     
(amount-par)/amount  0.0126 0.00936  0.0110  0.00507  -0.0287*  -0.0254* 
  (0.0148) (0.0152)  (0.0155)  (0.0153)  (0.0164)  (0.0145) 
(amount-par)/par  0.00141 0.00107 0.00118  0.000938  -0.00148  -0.00131 
  (0.00141) (0.00143) (0.00149)  (0.00144)  (0.00117)  (0.00142) 
Capital-to-Assets Ratio  -0.0455*  -0.0492** -0.0409*  -0.0580*** -0.00443  -0.0400 -0.0424*  -0.0366  -0.0529***  -0.00585 
  (0.0237) (0.0234)  (0.0235)  (0.0204)  (0.0437)  (0.0246) (0.0242)  (0.0242)  (0.0200)  (0.0431) 
Unlimited Liability  -0.0188** -0.0182**  -0.0174**  -0.0159*  -0.00938  -0.0186** -0.0182**  -0.0170**  -0.0133  -0.00679 
  (0.00802) (0.00799)  (0.00794)  (0.00840)  (0.00842)  (0.00790) (0.00787)  (0.00782)  (0.00801)  (0.00822) 
ln(Assets)  -0.00151 -0.00620**  -0.00226  -0.00768**  -0.000899  -0.00564**  -0.000760  -0.00769* 
  (0.00224) (0.00261)  (0.00272)  (0.00375)  (0.00233) (0.00279)  (0.00274)  (0.00393) 
Number of Branches  0.000154*** 0.000114***  6.23e-05  0.000147*** 9.95e-05***  5.75e-05 
  (3.73e-05) (3.41e-05)  (3.93e-05)  (3.73e-05) (3.45e-05) (4.15e-05) 
Establishment Year  5.48e-05 -3.87e-05  5.07e-05  -4.67e-05 
  (0.000109) (9.57e-05)  (0.000108)  (0.000101) 
Constant  0.0257*  0.0356** 0.0597  0.109***  -0.0263  0.175  0.0235*  0.0320** 0.0464  0.101**  -0.0573  0.175 
  (0.0132) (0.0144)  (0.0372)  (0.0392)  (0.188)  (0.170)  (0.0123)  (0.0140)  (0.0369)  (0.0406)  (0.188)  (0.182) 
Location dummy  no  no no  no  no  yes no no no  no  no  yes 
Observations  2,525  2,525 2,525  2,520  2,020  2,020 2,517 2,517 2,517  2,512  2,012  2,012 
R-squared  0.055  0.059 0.060  0.070  0.072  0.120 0.057 0.061 0.061  0.070  0.071  0.118 
Standard errors in parentheses                         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                         
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Table 5: Interaction Effects (Loans-to-Assets Ratio)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
VARIABLES             
             
(amount-par)/amount  -0.474*** -0.179*** -0.506*** -0.458*** -0.452***  -1.778*** -1.964***  -1.334 
 (0.128)  (0.0578)  (0.123)  (0.144) (0.139)  (0.666)  (0.716)  (1.029) 
Capital-to-Assets Ratio  -0.521*  0.289**  -0.636** -0.618** -0.606**  -0.673** -0.667  -0.701 
  (0.283) (0.124) (0.267) (0.283) (0.275) (0.279) (0.420) (0.430) 
Unlimited Liability  -0.0322  -0.201**  -0.251***  -0.221*** -0.226***  -0.221***  -0.218**  -0.166** 
  (0.0361) (0.0900) (0.0858) (0.0791) (0.0784) (0.0811) (0.0900) (0.0649) 
Capital-to-Assets Ratio * (amount-par)/amount 1.237***    1.355***  1.253*** 1.228***  1.311*** 1.387**  1.192* 
  (0.424)  (0.402)  (0.467)  (0.451) (0.444) (0.612) (0.665) 
Capital-to-Assets Ratio * Unlimited Liability    0.555**  0.724***  0.658***  0.671***  0.670***  0.645***  0.548*** 
    (0.234) (0.210) (0.195) (0.194) (0.203) (0.228) (0.164) 
ln(Assets)      -0.0228**  -0.0190 -0.0857***  -0.0912*** -0.0456 
      (0.0106)  (0.0128)  (0.0301)  (0.0341)  (0.0428) 
ln(Assets) * (amount-par)/amount        0.0890** 0.1000**  0.0595 
        (0.0414)  (0.0429)  (0.0570) 
Number  of  Branches       -0.000127  -0.000139  -0.000146  -5.74e-05 
       (0.000137)  (0.000132)  (0.000131)  (0.000127) 
Establishment  Year          -0.000132  0.000362 
          (0.000284)  (0.000439) 
Constant  0.858*** 0.660*** 0.886*** 1.231*** 1.187***  2.184***  2.499***  1.099 
  (0.0926) (0.0540) (0.0898)  (0.158) (0.184)  (0.472)  (0.790)  (1.073) 
Location dummy  no no no no  no no  no  yes
Observations  2,630 2,630 2,630 2,630 2,622  2,622  2,090  2,090 
R-squared  0.192 0.176 0.201 0.234 0.238  0.251  0.248  0.599 
Standard  errors  in  parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                 
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Table A1: Summary Statistics 
Variable   Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Observations 
SD of Stock Return  overall  0.028  0.048 0.000 0.658 N  =        2103 
  between    0.018  0.000  0.108  n =     118 
  within    0.046  -0.062  0.646  T =  17.822 
Loan-to-Asset Ratio  overall  0.660  0.153 0.119 1.000 N  =        2631 
  between    0.146  0.227  0.961  n =     143 
  within    0.078 0.095 1.164 T-bar  =  18.3986 
Cash-to-Asset Ratio  overall  0.157  0.080 0.000 1.758 N  =        2461 
  between    0.074  0.020  0.597  n =     140 
  within    0.049 -0.124  1.715 T-bar  =  17.5786 
Asset Growth  overall  0.035  0.085  -0.588  0.689  N =    2526 
  between    0.051  -0.141  0.223  n =     140 
  within    0.078 -0.449  0.640 T  =  18.0429 
(amount - par)/amount  overall  0.696  0.167 0.000 1.000 N  =        2636 
  between    0.177  0.000  1.000  n =     143 
  within    0.077 -0.115  0.930 T-bar  =  18.4336 
(amount - par)/par  overall  3.126  1.959  0.000  24.000  N =    2627 
  between    1.918  0.000  10.429  n =     142 
  within    0.780  -4.303  21.445  T-bar =    18.5 
Unlimited Liability  overall  0.046  0.208 0.000 1.000 N  =        2636 
  between    0.115  0.000  1.000  n =     143 
  within    0.190 -0.500  1.017 T-bar  =  18.4336 
Capital-toAsset Ratio  overall  0.257  0.102 0.018 1.558 N  =        2636 
  between    0.121  0.032  1.081  n =     143 
  within    0.057 -0.251  0.940 T-bar  =  18.4336 
ln(Asset) overall  14.823  1.368  8.961  18.468  N =    2636 
  between    1.509  9.568  17.981  n =     143 
  within   0.346  13.220 16.123 T-bar  =  18.4336 
Branch  overall  39.60868  76.38624  0  768  N =    2627   37
  between    70.31374  0  519.2143  n =     142 
  within    35.25864  -197.606  402.8944  T-bar =    18.5 
Establishment Year  overall  1832.196  29.078  1685  1884  N =    2098 
  between    29.135  1685  1884  n =     102 
  within    0.000  1832.196 1832.196 T-bar  =  20.5686 
Year  overall  1892.541  9.097  1878  1912  N =    2636 
  between    6.637  1878  1911  n =     143 
  within    7.599  1875.541 1909.541 T-bar  =  18.4336 
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Table A2: Correlation coefficient with p-value for statistical significance 
 
















ln(Asset) Branches  Establishme
nt Year 
SD of Stock Return 
 
1             
Loan-to-Asset  Ratio  0.0267  1           
  0.2208            
Cash-to-Asset  Ratio  0.0172  -0.4026  1          
  0.4469  0           
Asset  Growth  -0.0109  -0.0838  0.0835  1         
  0.6228  0  0          
(amount  -  par)/amount  -0.007  -0.2131  0.0676  0.0266  1        
  0.75  0  0.0008  0.1811         
(amount  -  par)/par  0.0505  -0.1683  0.1428  0.0341  0.7915  1       
  0.0206  0  0  0.0874  0        
Unlimited Liability  0.0406  0.0837  -0.0517 -0.0512 -0.1863 -0.1171  1         
  0.0628  0  0.0103  0.0101  0  0       
Capital-to Asset Ratio  -0.0695  0.2798  -0.1545  -0.0526  -0.0414  -0.1122  0.0922  1       
  0.0014 0  0 0.0082  0.0336 0  0         
ln(Asset)  -0.0296 -0.3363 0.3964 -0.0137 0.1303 0.1889 -0.0339 -0.2678  1     
  0.1745 0  0 0.4924 0  0 0.0822 0       
Branches  -0.0252  -0.3046 0.2719 0.0675 0.1507 0.1452 -0.0667  -0.2761 0.6474  1   
  0.249  0  0 0.0007 0  0 0.0006 0  0     
Establishment  Year  0.0415 0.0534 -0.0509 0.0115 -0.0792 -0.0874 0.0114 0.0202  -0.207 -0.1948  1 
  0.0887 0.0146 0.0246 0.6054 0.0003 0.0001 0.6026 0.3553  0  0   
 